Introduction
The ability o f international institutions to influence each other's develop ment and effectiveness ( 'institutional interaction' ) is increasingly recognized. Whereas international institutions have traditionally been analysed in isolation from each other (Haas et al., 19 9 3 ; Victor et al., 1998, Miles et al., 1996) and identified the risk o f 'treaty congestion' (Brown Weiss, 1993: 679) . Contributions on institutional interaction have mostly examined spe cific situations such as the problematic relationship between the World Trade Organization (W TO) and several multilateral environmental agreements with trade restrictions (Tarasofsky, 199 7 ; Brack, 2 0 0 2 ), overlapping jurisdic tions o f human rights institutions and related courts (Tistounet, 20 0 0 ) , or the interaction between the International Labour Organization (ILO ) and the W TO (Compa and Diamond, 19 9 6 ; Moorman, 2 0 0 1 ).
Conceptual knowledge about the causal mechanisms through which influ ence travels from one institution to another has, however, remained sharply limited (see the overview in Stokke, 2001a: 1 -8 ; Gehring and Oberthiir 20 0 9 ) . Existing approaches focus on an interaction situation or a 'regime complex' (Raustiala and Victor, 2 0 0 4 ) without systematically analysing the causal relationship between the institutions involved, or they mainly attempt to systematize and categorize phenomena o f institutional interaction (e.g. Young, 2 0 0 2 ; Stokke, 2 0 0 0 , 2 0 0 1 b ; Rosendal, 2 0 0 1 ; Young et al., 2008) . Other contributions address particular aspects o f interaction, such as the nesting o f institutions within each other (Aggarwal, 1998) .
This article develops a conceptual framework for the systematic analysis o f the interaction o f international institutions as a first step towards building a theory o f institutional interaction. It examines how international institu tions may exert causal influence on each other's development and effectiveness. To this end, it introduces a conceptual framework that focuses on the explo ration o f causal mechanisms o f institutional interaction. This framework is based upon established approaches assessing regime effectiveness and the causal analysis o f regime consequences (Bernauer, 1995; Underdal and Young, 2004) . We develop four causal mechanisms that elucidate the distinct routes through which influence can travel from one institution to another and reveal the role o f various actors in this process. These causal mechanisms rely on transfer o f knowledge, commitments established under an institution, ehavioural effects o f an institution, and functional interdependence of the ulnmate targets of governance o f the institutions involved. In accordance with t ie bulk o f literature on the effectiveness o f international governance insti tutions, we focus exclusively on negotiated institutions that may be defined as persistent and connected sets o f rules and practices that prescribe behavîoura roes, constrain activity, and shape expectations' (Keohane, 1989: 3) . Relevant institutions include both international regimes and i n t e r n a tio n a l organizations.
1 he identified causal mechanisms o f interaction help analyse r e a l-w o rld cases of institutional interaction and provide the foundation for the evelopment o f a theory o f institutional interaction. Each o f them reflects a istinct rationale o f institutional interaction. Similar to the familiar 126 game-theoretic models that help understand cooperation problems (Snidal, 1985 ; Martin, 1 9 9 3 ), they abstract from the complexity o f real-world cases of institutional interaction and draw attention to the underlying rationales o f interaction. More specific ideal types o f institutional interaction, which we develop on the basis o f the causal mechanisms, help assess systematically the conditions that must be fulfilled for institutional interaction to occur and the likely effects o f interaction for governance within the international system. However, we do not make any claims as to which institutions are particularly prone to institutional interaction.
Although we illustrate our argument primarily with cases from inter national environmental governance, the causal mechanisms and ideal types are applicable to international institutions at large. The models have been developed against the backdrop o f the largest comparative assessment so far of more than 150 cases o f institutional interaction from the realm o f inter national and E U environmental institutions (Oberthiir and Gehring, 2006a) . However, their distinct rationales are independent from any specific policy area. They can be applied to interaction situations located within other policy fields and cutting across policy fields.
Cause-Effect Relationship a nd Causal Mechanisms of Institutional Interaction

Establishing a Cause-E ffect R elationship between Two Institutions
Institutional interaction will exist if one institution (the source institution) affects the development or performance o f another institution (the target institution). Otherwise, we would merely observe the parallel, but causally unrelated, development o f two or more institutions. Causation implies that an effect observed within the target institution or its issue-area is attributable to another institution so that we would not expect the effect to occur in the absence o f the source institution (King et al., 1994: 7 5 -8 5 ) . To establish an incident o f institutional interaction, we must identify (1) the source insti tution (or its particular component or decision) from which influence origin ates as the independent variable; (2) the target institution (or the particular component) that is subject to influence originating from the source institu tion as the dependent variable; and (3) a cause-effect relationship between the source institution and the target institution that accounts for the iden tified effect. There is no institutional interaction without an effect within the target institution or the issue-area governed by it, be it observable or antici pated (Gehring and Oberthiir, 2 0 0 4 ).
I f an in te ractio n situ ation includes several cases o f in teractio n with distinct ca u se -e ffe ct relationships, the cases m ust be separately analysed.
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Decomposition o f complex interaction situations will be especially relevant in three types o f situations. (Archer, 1985; Carlsnaes, 1992) . For example, the global Basel Convention on the 1 ransboundary Movement o f Hazardous Wastes triggered the establishment of several regional regimes with tighter regulatory approaches. Subsequently, the latter influenced the development o f the Basel Convention (Clapp, 1994) . The consequences o f a case o f institutional interaction may be beneficial, adverse, or neutral for the target institution. The main effects o f institutional interaction occur in the target institution and can be assessed against this institution's prime objective.2 I f the effects o f institutional interaction sup port the objectives o f the target institution, they will create synergy between the two institutions involved. I f they contradict the target institution's object ive, they will result in disruption. The effects o f an interaction will be inde terminate or neutral if they do not clearly hamper or reinforce the pursuit of the target institution's objective.
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128 85-7) and provides an explanadon for the causal effect observed. It may be conceived o f as a set o f statements that are logically connected and provide a plausible account o f how a given cause creates an observed effect (Schelling, 1998) . In the absence o f both firmly established theories o f institutional interaction and large-« studies allowing for statistical analysis, causal mecha nisms help distinguish between genuine causality and 'spurious correlation'. They make explicit the underlying causal pathway that links the source insti tution to the target institution (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998: 7 -1 2 ) . Causal mechanisms provide a micro-foundation for the analysis o f institu tional interaction and reveal how actors matter in the process (George and Bennett, 2 0 0 5 : 1 3 5 -4 5 ). In cases o f institutional interaction, both the inde pendent and the dependent variables, i.e. the source institution and the target institution, are located at the macro-level. However, an international institution will rarely influence another institution directly without intermediate adaptation of preferences or behaviour by relevant actors. Hence, a concept o f institutional interaction requires, like any other theory in the social sciences, a reliable micro-macro link (Buzan et al., 1993: 104; Alexander and Giesen, 1987) .3 A causal mechanism links the micro-level o f actors with the macro-level o f insti tutions. It elucidates how actors are involved in transferring influence from one institution to the other. Depending on the precise causal mechanism at work, several types o f actors, including states, non-governmental organizations, industry, or the secretariats o f international institutions, may play an important role in institutional interaction (see also Selin and VanDeveer, 2003) .
A typical causal mechanism explaining how one institution exerts influ ence on another institution involves three distinct steps, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Instead o f analysing relationships between phenomena exclu sively on the m acro-level, it seeks to establish how macro-level events or conditions affect the individual (step 1), how the individual assimilates the impact o f th e se macro-level events (step 2 ), and how several individuals, through their actions and interactions, generate macro-level outcomes (step 3) (H edstrom and Swedberg, 19 9 8 : 2 1 -2 ; Coleman, 1990 . 1 -2 3 ). A cco rd in g ly , a situational m ech a n ism reveals how the so u rce institution affects the preferences or behaviour o f relevant actors within its own domain. An action-form ation mechanism elucidates how this effect leads to a change o f preferences or o f individual behaviour of actors relevant to the target institution. In this step, influence is transferred from the domain o f the source institution to the domain o f the target institution. Finally, a transformational mechanism explains how the adaptation o f the individual preferences or behaviour o f relevant actors leads to a change o f the target institution (for example in the form o f adapted rules) or o f its effectiveness within its issue-area (for example through an increased rate o f noncompliance). A causal relationship between the source institution and the target institution presupposes that all three com ponent mechanisms are activated.
I he empirical causal relationship between a given source institution and a possible target institution has to be carefully analysed according to the wellestablished methods o f causal inference in the social sciences (George and Bennett, 2 0 0 5 ). I hese methods include counterfactual scenarios and the exclusion o f rival explanations. The construction o f counterfactual scenarios addresses the hypothetical question o f how the target institution and the issue-area governed by it would have developed in the absence o f the source institution (Fearon, 1991) . The exclusion o f alternative explanations (Bernauer, 1995) explores whether factors other than the source institution might convincingly explain the effects observed within the target institution or its issue-area. These methods are widely employed in the literature on the effectiveness o f international regimes (Underdal, 2 0 0 4 ).
I heoretically derived causal mechanisms o f institutional interaction help identify the targets o f a causal influence, the precise causal pathways and their intermediate stages as well as the involved actors. Much like the well-known game theoretic models ot socially problematic situations, such as the 1 risoner s Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes, they constitute models that cannot be empirically right or wrong (Snidal, 1985) . However, they can elu cidate the core aspects o f the underlying cause-effect relationship, if they fit a given case o f institutional interaction.
To avoid overdetermination o f causal relationships, which is a typical prob lem o f causal mechanisms analysis (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998: 10) , the theoretically derived causal mechanisms developed in this article are mutu ally exclusive. In this way, we ensure that the same pathway is not part o f dif ferent models. I f a full set o f general causal mechanisms capable o f driving institutional interaction is av ailable, the empirical analysis o f a particular case may focus on choosing the model which best reflects the properties o f the case, and on establishing whether all o f its component sub-mechanisms are actually at work.
Institutional interaction can occur on all three levels o f effectiveness of governance institutions. To be effective, a governance institution must pro duce an appropriate output in the form o f collective knowledge or norms prescribing, proscribing or permitting behaviour. The output may generate behavioural change o f relevant actors, the outcome. Finally, changes o f behav iour might have an im p act on the ultimate governance target. This effec tiveness cascade is well established in the literature on international regimes (Underdal, 2 0 0 4 : 3 4 ). It is illustrated in Figure 2 on the left side for the source institution and on the right side for the target institution (thin verti cal arrows). In cases o f institutional interaction, the output of the source institution eventually exerts influence on the ultimate target o f governance (impact) o f the target institution. As illustrated in Figure 2 , we identify four distinct theoretical causal mech anisms, which involve different targets o f influence, actors and/or compon ent sub-mechanisms. I f causal influence can travel through different pathways from one institution to another, we need a set o f different theor etically derived causal mechanisms. The causal mechanisms differ as to how far the effectiveness cascade o f the source institution is passed down before influence is transferred to the target side (bold arrows). Two causal mech anisms exert influence on the normative development o f the target institution and are located at the output level. Two other causal mechanisms affect the performance o f the target institution within its own issue-area directly with out prior adjustment o f its norms and rules. They are located at the outcome level and at the impact level.
The causal mechanisms, as well as more specific ideal types o f institutional interaction that reflect distinct characteristics o f cases driven by the same causal mechanism, allow us to make the first steps towards developing a theory o f institutional interaction. To this end, we examine three particularly important aspects o f institutional interaction reflected in the causal models. First, the models elucidate the different causal pathways through which one international institution can influence another international institution. Second, we explore the necessary conditions that must be fulfilled for inter action o f a particular type to occur. Third, we derive hypotheses as to the likely quality o f interaction effects for the target institution. However, at the present state o f knowledge about institutional interaction, we cannot put forward meaningful hypotheses as to the sufficient conditions under which institutional interaction is expected to occur.
The Causal Mechanism of Cognitive Interaction
In tro d u cin g th e causal m echanism o f C o g n itiv e In te ra c tio n , we first discuss the rationale o f this causal m echanism . S u b seq u en tly , w e p resen t tw o ideal types o f C o g n itiv e In te ra ctio n , nam ely learn in g fro m a po licy m o d el and a request for assistance.
R ation ale
C ognitiv e In teractio n is based o n th e pow er o f kn ow led ge and ideas. It may e conceived o f as a particu lar fo rm o f in ter-in stitu tio n a l lea rn in g (similarly î o o î f ' 5 01a' 1 0 )' Information' knowledge or ideas (Haas, 1992 ; Yee, 1W 6) produced within one institution may modify the perception ofdecisionma ers operating within another institution and thus significantly affect the 132 decision-making process o f this institution. For example, the members o f an institution may discover, and decide to adopt, an institutional innovation introduced within another institution, such as a non-compliance procedure or a particular arrangement for providing assistance to developing countries.
Cognitive Interaction evolves in the following steps. First, the source insti tution needs to generate some new information such as a report revealing new scientific or technological insights or an institutional arrangement solv ing a particular regulatory problem. Second, some actor (e.g. a member state or a non-governmental organization) has to feed the information into the decision-making process o f the target institution. Third, this information must change the order o f preferences o f actors relevant to the target institu tion. Fourth, this modification o f actors' preferences has to influence the col lective negotiation process and the output o f the target institution. Cognitive Interaction is the least intrusive o f all causal mechanisms because learning cannot be imposed. Consequently, the source institution does not exert any pressure on the decision-makers o f the target institution. I f relevant actors adapt their preferences, the effects will be felt even by those members of the target institution that have not been convinced.
Cognitive Interaction can only be expected to occur if the interests pursued by relevant actors o f the target institution are, unlike the frequent assumption o f rational choice co-operation theory, not fully determined (see Martin, 19 9 3 ; Hasenclever et al., 1997) . Rational actors can be expected to learn voluntarily only if their rationality is 'bounded', because their informa tion processing capacity is limited (Keohane, 1984 : 1 0 0 -1 5 ; Haas, 2001 ) , or if relevant information is not entirely available. Under these circumstances, actors will be prepared to adapt their preferences to new information (Checkel, 1 9 9 8 ; Risse, 2 0 0 0 ) that may originate from other institutions.
Cognitive Interaction occurs in two forms, depending on whether the learning process within the target institution is triggered unintentionally or intentionally by the source institution. The two types differ significantly in respect o f both the preconditions for their occurrence and the expected qual ity o f interaction effects.
Unintentionally Triggered Cognitive Interaction: Policy Model
tf Cognitive Interaction is u n in ten tion ally triggered, members o f the target institution voluntarily use so m e aspect o f the source institution as a policy model. For example, the compliance system under the Montreal Protocol for the protection o f the ozone layer influenced the negotiations on the comph^ ance system under the Kyoto Protocol on climate c h a n g e because it provided a model o f how to supervise implementation and deal with cases o f possible non-compliance (Oberthür and O tt, 1999: 2 1 5 -2 2 ). The members o f the Montreal Protocol did not establish the model in order to influence the Kyoto Protocol. They also did not have the ability to impose their model on the target. Instead, the Montreal Protocol presented an institutional arrange ment which the members o f the Kyoto Protocol conceived o f as a useful source o f inspiration. Frequently, a model will be adapted so as to fit the par ticular needs o f the target institution ('complex learning'; see Haas, 1990) . Thus, the negotiators o f the Kyoto Protocol adapted and strengthened the model o f the compliance system o f the Montreal Protocol according to their particular needs (Werksman, 2 0 0 5 ).
The policy-model type o f Cognitive Interaction can occur between any two institutions, whether or not their memberships or issue-areas overlap. Any institutional arrangement, decision, or scientific or technological information from any other institution might serve as a policy model. Institutions share a number o f functional challenges such as monitoring, verification, enforcement and decision-making as well as the development o f governance instruments. I herefore, it is difficult to foresee which kind o f information or decision ori ginating from which institution might prompt interaction o f this kind. Also, numerous types o f actors may pick up the information or idea and feed it into the decision-making process o f another institution, including a member state, a non-governmental organization, the secretariat o f the target institution, or relevant individuals. These actors do not even have to participate in the source institution, because they can obtain information and ideas by surveying the field, reading reports, or examining institutional arrangements.
Learning from a policy model can generally be expected to strengthen the effectiveness o f the target institution, while the source institution will largely remain unaffected. It requires that the members o f the target institution col lectively consider the policy model to be useful. Normally, actors will refrain from adopting precedents or solutions that promise to undermine their com monly desired policies. In rare cases, however, actors may also learn how to deliberately hamper effectiveness. Thus, negotiators o f the Kyoto Protocol ailed to agree on an institutional arrangement for feeding scientific and technical knowledge into policy-making that had proven to be effective under the Montreal Protocol, because parties opposing advances in inter national climate policy had learnt their lesson (Oberthür, 2 0 0 1 : 360-1)-Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that actors learn 'wrong' lessons that are ys inctional for the target institution, for example because the two institu tions or their underlying problems are more distinct than expected.
Intentionally Triggered Cognitive In teraction: R equest f o r Assistance
C ognitive In teractio n m ay also take th e form o f an in te n tio n a l request by one institu tion fo r th e assistance o f a n o th er in stitu tio n . T h e so u rce institution 134 can draw the attention o f actors within the target institution to a particular aspect o f which they had so far not taken due account -at least seen from the perspective o f the source institution. Accordingly, actors o f the target institution learn that an adaptation o f their institution could strengthen the effectiveness o f the source institution. For example, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species o f Wild Fauna and Flora (C IT E S) requested assistance for the implementation and enforcement o f its trade restrictions from the World Customs Organization (W CO) which adapted its customs codes accordingly (Lanchbery, 20 0 6 ). In cases o f a request for assistance, the source institution largely frames the learning process. Its secretariat will usually formally transfer a request to the secretariat of the target institution that will officially feed it into the decision-making process o f the latter.
The prerequisites for a successful request for assistance are much more demanding than those for learning from a policy model. On the one hand, a successful request presupposes that the issue-areas governed by the institu tions involved overlap significantly. It would not be useful for C IT ES to request assistance from the W C O , i f W CO policies did not matter for the implementation o f C IT E S. On the other hand, the requested adaptation of policies must be beneficial, or at least neutral, for the target institution, because the members o f the target institution will usually not be inclined vol untarily to harm their institution. However, they may find it difficult to reject another institution's request for assistance with indifferent effects. Thus, the W CO responded favourably to the request o f C IT E S to adapt its customs codes although it d id not directly benefit from doing so.
Whereas an inter-institutional request for assistance can be expected to produce synergistic or at least neutral effects for the target institution, it is intended to create a positive feedback effect on the source institution. C IT E S requested the World Customs Organization to adapt, because it expected this change to facilitate the enforcement o f its own policy. Hence, requests for assistance enable an institution to draw on other institutions in order to enhance its own effectiveness, even if it cannot force the target institution to adapt its rules.4
The Causal Mechanism o f Interaction through Commitment
In this s e c tio n , vve first d evelop th e general rationale o f th e causal m echanism o f In te ra c tio n th ro u g h Commitment. Subsequently, w e p resen t th ree ideal types o f this causal mechanism, nam ely in stitu tional in teractio n th a t creates a d em an d fo r ju risd ic tio n a l d e lim ita tio n , in te ra ctio n b etw een n ested in stitu tio n s, and in stitu tion al in te ra ctio n activating an ad ditional m eans o f g ov ern an ce.
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R ation ale
Interaction through Commitment is based on the power o f international norms. Commitments entered into under one institution may induce actors to modify their preferences and negotiating behaviour regarding issues related to another institution. These modifications may in turn affect the decision-making process o f that institution. For example, the W TO commit ment not to discriminate against imported goods according to the methods by which they have been produced renders it difficult for W TO members to adopt trade sanctions within international environmental regimes or within the International Labour Organization (IL O ) to reinforce the effectiveness o f these institutions (Brack, 2 0 0 2 ).
In line with theories o f international institutions, the causal mechanism pre supposes that international obligations create at least some binding force. Actors behaving according to the constructivist 'logic o f appropriateness' (March and Olsen, 1998) will generally follow valid norms, because such behaviour is legitimate and reduces the costs o f instrumental decision making. Actors behaving according to the rationalist 'logic o f consequences' will also frequendy adhere to valid norms. Often institutional obligations cannot be violated without jeopardizing underlying cooperation projects. Actors might also endeavour to preserve a reputation o f keeping their promises because possible future cooperators would otherwise be less inclined to enter into agreements with them (Keohane, 1984 : 1 0 5 -6 ). I f commitments entered into within one institution are costly, actors will gain an additional interest in subjecting the members o f other institutions to similar obligations.
Interaction through Commitment evolves in the following steps. First, members o f the source institution agree upon an obligation that might be relevant for the target institution. Second, this obligation actually commits one or more states that are members o f both institutions. Third, the com mitment induces some o f these states to modify their preferences and negoti ating behaviour related to the target institution. Fourth, these modifications influence the collective decision-making process o f the target institution and its output.
In teractio n th rou gh C o m m itm e n t requ ires som e overlap o f b o th the memberships and the issue-areas of the interacting institutions. Without overlapping memberships, the target institution would remain unaffected because none o f its members would be subject to relevant c o m m it m e n t s under t h e sou rce in stitu tion . W i t h o u t overlapping issu e-areas, c o m m i t m e n t s cou ld n o t m odify the p references o f states reg ard in g issues rela ted to the tar get in stitu tion .
In te ractio n th ro u g h C o m m itm e n t o ccu rs in th ree d istin ct types, w hich differ profou nd ly regard ing th eir in h eren t ration ales as w ell as regarding 136 their specific preconditions and expected effects. Whereas some overlap o f memberships and issues o f interacting institutions is necessary to generate Interaction through Commitment, we would not expect institutions to exert significant influence on each other's normative development if they were identical in all important respects. Accordingly, interacting institutions must differ in some important dimension to create momentum for interaction. Meaningful interaction effects can be expected if otherwise overlapping insti tutions differ in respect o f their memberships, or o f their objectives, or o f their governance instruments, because these three properties determine the who, why and how o f international governance projects. The three types of Interaction through Commitment developed in the following vary with respect to exactly one o f these three dimensions.
Interaction through C om m itm ent Based upon D ifferent Objectives: Ju risdiction al D elim itation
Demand for the delimitation o f jurisdictions will arise if two institutions with similar memberships, but different objectives, address the same set o f issues. Under these circumstances, actors may adapt the policies, norms and obliga tions o f one o f these institutions in light o f the existence o f the other. For example, the obligations o f the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity conferring rights of control to states importing genetically modified organisms (GM O s) were significantly adapted to the broader commitments under the W'l O Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) (Oberthiir and Gehring, 2006b) .
Institutions with different objectives may diverge in their appraisal o f par ticular policies. Every international institution disposes o f its own criteria to assess policy measures and the related behaviour o f states and non-state actors (Gehring, 1994: 4 3 3 -4 9 ) . As a result, different institutions may appraise a policy measure differently. Environmentally motivated trade restrictions will be considered as undesired interference with international trade from the perspective o f the W TO , which aims at liberalizing inter national trade and seeks to abolish trade obstacles. The same measures are appreciated as effective means for enforcing international environmental standards from the perspective o f international environmental regimes, which are frequently established to protect common pool resources or col lective goods.
In jurisdictional delimitation cases, the members o f the institutions involved are in a 'mixed motive' situation that resembles the game-theoretic constellation o f the Battle o f the Sexes (Stein, 1982; Keohane, 1984) . On the one hand, both sides possess a general interest in some sort o f separation o f jurisdictions in order to avoid fruitless regulatory competition and a reduced effectiveness o f their respective institutions. Neither side will be served if the institutions involved interfere with each other. On the other hand, the constituencies o f the institutions will have conflicting preferences regarding the appropriate solution. In the conflict between trade and envi ronment, actors prioritizing liberal international trade will advocate regula tion by the W TO , while countries struggling for environmental protection may prefer the jurisdiction o f the environmental regimes involved.
Commitments o f the earlier institution will almost automatically limit the room for manoeuvre within the later institution, because they strengthen actors advocating the objectives o f the earlier institution. Like the gametheoretic Battle o f the Sexes situation, the ideal type o f Jurisdictional Delimitation does not possess a single equilibrium. However, an equilibrium found in a Battle o f the Sexes situation will be fairly stable, because neither side can expect to gain from resumption o f conflict. This implies that the earlier institution will possess a 'first-mover advantage' (Héritier, 1996; Mattli, 2003) . In the trade and environment debate, the older GATT/W TO has been viewed as 'chilling' the negotiations on environmental regimes because negotiators have frequently shied away from even discussing measures that might be in conflict with GATT/W TO rules (Palmer et al., 2 0 0 6 : 186; Eckersley, 2 0 0 4 ). In this case, the first-mover advantage o f the W TO has limited the range o f options available to negotiators within environmental regimes.
The challenge o f an established distribution o f jurisdictions may lead to open conflict among the institutions involved. T he jurisdiction o f an institu tion can be challenged by agreeing on incompatible commitments within another institution. Creation o f such 'strategic inconsistency' (Raustiala and Victor, 20 0 4 : 301) will be particularly relevant if new regulatory objectives such as environmental protection are to be promoted in a field already gov" erned by an existing institution with differing objectives. Thus, in t e r n a tio n a l environmental regimes established since the 1970s have almost automatically encroached upon the jurisdiction o f the established international trade regime whenever they have restricted trade for environmental p u rp o s e s . Hence, environmental regimes have gradually pushed back the jurisdiction of the W TO and partially reversed the latter's 'chill effect' (Oberthür and Gehring, 2006b ).
Jurisdictional delimitation cases will virtually always create disruptive effects on the target institution. Because o f their diverging objectives, the institutions involved pull in different directions. The source institution encroac es upon the jurisdiction o f the target institution. As a result, the e ectiveness o f the target institution will almost inevitably be undermined, n amicable delimitation o f issue-areas may only be expected if one instiution clearly dominates. Accordingly, the ideal type o f jurisdictional delimitation poses the governance challenge to arrive at a delimitation o f jurisdictions that honours the basic objectives o f both institutions and is least detrimental for their operation.
Interaction through C om m itm ent Based upon D ifferent Memberships: Nested Institutions
Interaction between nested institutions constitutes a mechanism for policy diffusion that gains its momentum from the tension between institutions with a smaller (regional) and a larger (global) membership. It is driven by the different memberships o f two international institutions that ideally pursue identical objectives and employ the same governance instruments. If the membership o f one institution forms part o f the membership o f another institution, two formally independent institutions with similar objectives and regulatory means are 'nested' into each other (Aggarwal, 1998; Young, 1996) . For example, the Schengen regime on the abolition o f controls at internal borders among the member states and on compensating measures heavily influenced the development o f corollary policies within the European Union (Gehring, 1998) . The ideal type o f interaction between nested institutions rests on the fol lowing factors. First, negotiation analysis demonstrates that institutions with divergent memberships may arrive at differing obligations, even if addressing identical problems (Sebenius, 1983) . It is typically easier to reach agreement within a smaller (e.g. regional) than in a larger (e.g. global) institution because a higher number o f participants usually implies a greater hetero geneity of interests (Snidal, 19 9 4 ) . Hence, the originally few Schengen states could agree on the abolition o f border controls and compensating measures, while similar agreement proved initially impossible within the broader EU membership.5 Second, commitments agreed upon within the source institu tion streamline the preferences o f its members. As a result, the members develop a com m on interest in expanding obligations to other countries be it to commit competitors to costly obligations, to preclude free-riding, or to reinforce the effectiveness o f their agreement.6 Third, based upon their common commitment, members of the smaller institution form a natural coalition during negotiations within the larger institution. Hence, the prob ability increases that the coordinated position o f the coalition constitutes some 'focal point' (Schelling, I9 6 0 : 100) around which expectations con verge.
Interaction between nested institutions presupposes that two (or more ) institutions with similar objectives but different memberships govern signifi cantly overlapping issue-areas, and that the political dynamics of agreeing new obligations differs significantly. Evidently, the presence o f these factors 139 on does not ensure that interaction occurs, because adverse constellations of interests prevailing within the larger institution may effectively preclude adoption o f a policy measure agreed upon in the smaller setting. They con stitute merely necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the emergence o f this type o f interaction.
The rationale o f interaction between nested institutions suggests that its effects will largely support the effectiveness o f the target institution. Similar or identical objectives o f the institutions generate compatible priorities and ren er disruptive effects highly improbable, if not impossible. Accordingly, t is type o f interaction provides a mechanism for policy diffusion within the same policy field and offers opportunities for forum shopping. Actors striv ing or regulation o f a particular issue may choose whether to promote their proposa s predominantly in the smaller or in the larger institution -with a view to using the smaller institution strategically to promote policy diffusion.
Interaction through C om m itm ent based upon A vailability o f D ifferen t Governance Instruments: A d d ition al M eans
The transfer o f a commitment from one institution to another one pursuing e same o jective with identical membership may be significant for inter-« /ki ®ovc*71ance ^ activates an additional governance instrument (means) r, a* a . C r°C , targct institution. The interaction between the regime for the Sea c ICp n ° 1 C ^ort^ ^ast Atlantic (OSPAR) and the International North establislle£l in the 1980s may serve as an illustration. While took S a r " < ! eCl^ti!0nS, that Were formal,y non-binding, the Conferences Dolitirallv6 3 a p° cal level and generated political pressure. Having became f °n. * ° P^ase' out o f certain substances and activities, it identical nh|CU ■ °F 1 e ,niem^cr states to resist the adoption o f substantively on 'soft' law, others resort to legally binding ( 'hard' ) international law (Abbott and Snidal, 2 0 0 0 ). The European Union even controls supranational law that is subject to a particularly stringent supervisory apparatus (Alter, 2000) . Some institutions dispose o f financial assistance mechanisms (Keohane and Levy, 199 6 ) , non-compliance procedures (Victor et al., 1998) , particular enforcement measures, etc. while others do not.
Interaction o f the additional means type will regularly raise the effective ness o f both institutions involved. I f the diffusion o f an obligation activates an additional governance instrument, it will support the effectiveness o f the target institution. At the same time, activating an additional means automat ically contributes to a more effective implementation o f the source institu tion. In the aforementioned example, the more effective implementation of hard-law O SPA R obligations to protect the Northeast Atlantic automatically helped achieve the goals o f the North Sea Conferences.7 Because o f its synergistic effects on both the source and the target institution, interaction activating additional means allows actors operating within the source institu tion to enhance the effectiveness o f international governance and provides opportunities for choosing in which o f the institutions available to launch a particular regulatory initiative (forum shopping).
The Causal Mechanism o f Behavioural Interaction
Behavioural Interaction is based on the interdependence o f behaviour across the domains o f institutions. The source institution triggers behavioural changes that affect implementation in the target institution. This causal mechanism is located at the outcome level and influences the performance o f the target institution within its own domain. All international governance institutions are designed to influence the behaviour o f relevant actors in order to achieve their objectives (Levy et al., 1995; Young, 1992) . In some cases, behavioural changes occurring within the domain o f one institution exert influence on the domain o f another institution. If states and private actors plant fast-growing trees in response to the Kyoto Protocol's incentive for carbon sequestration in forests, they might automatically encroach upon biodiversity, which is protected under the Convention on Biological Diversity (C B D ) (Jacquem ont and Caparrôs, 2 0 0 2 ), and thereby undermine the effectiveness o f the C BD .
Behavioural Interaction evolves in the following steps. First, the source institution must produce an output, for example a set o f prescriptions or pro scriptions. Second, relevant states or non-state actors have to adapt their behaviour in response to the output. Third, the behavioural changes trig gered by the source institution must be relevant for the target institution.
Behavioural changes may be relevant for b o th issue-areas, or they may prompt further behavioural changes within the domain o f the target institu tion. Fourth, this behavioural effect has to be relevant for the effectiveness o f the target institution.
Behavioural Interaction has two important prerequisites. First, it requires that the source institution actually exerts influence on the behaviour o f rele vant states (e.g. implementing legal obligations) and/or on the behaviour of non-state actors (e.g. adjusting to domestic implementation legislation). Second, the issue-areas governed by the institutions involved must be close enough to matter for each other. Behavioural Interaction cannot be expected to occur if the issue-areas do not significantly overlap or are functionally unrelated to each other. Under these circumstances, behaviour triggered by one institution would hardly become relevant for another institution. In con trast, Behavioural Interaction does not depend on a collective decision within the target institution, because it occurs exclusively within the two issue-areas involved. Unlike Cognitive Interaction and Interaction through Commitment, Behavioural Interaction might even come about unnoticed by the actors operating within the target institution.
Whereas the general causal mechanism o f Behavioural Interaction does not indicate whether its effects are beneficial (synergistic) or adverse (dis ruptive) for the target institution, the rationales o f three specific ideal types reveal clear-cut hypotheses on the quality o f effects. The types vary as to whether the institutions involved differ in respect o f their objectives, or their memberships, or their governance instruments.
If Behavioural Interaction is driven by different objectives o f the involved institutions, it will result in disruption o f the target institution. In this case, the same group o f actors ideally addresses the same issue within two institu tions that pursue different objectives. As a result, behavioural changes of states and non-state actors triggered by the source institution may easily be at odds with the objectives o f the target institution and may thus undermine the latter s performance. It is difficult to think o f a situation in which they could systematically reinforce the effectiveness o f the target institution. Behavioural Interaction driven by different objectives is closely related to jurisdictional delimitation cases located at the output level. Indeed, cases of both types appear frequently in concert. For example, the conflict between the W TO and international environmental institutions with trade restrictions is not limited to the rules made at the output level. It extends to the imple mentation o f these rules at the o u t c o m e level. Whenever a m e m b e r state imp ements a trade restriction enacted under an environmental regime, it will implicitly undermine the effectiveness o f the W TO rules on free trade.
Behavioural Interaction relies upon different memberships o f the insti tutions involved, it will always create synergy. In this case, different groups o actors, 1 eally, address the same issue, employing identical means o f 142 governance within two institutions that pursue like objectives. Due to the matching objectives, behavioural changes triggered by one institution will automatically be in conformity with the policy direction o f the other. This type o f Behavioural Interaction constitutes the corollary o f interaction between nested institutions at the output level. Compared with the latter, however, the direction o f influence is reversed: only the larger (global) insti tution can trigger behavioural effects beyond those already triggered by the smaller (regional) institution. Again, cases located at the output level may be linked to cases located at the outcome level. While the regional Bamako Convention on the transboundary movement o f hazardous wastes con tributed to a rule change o f the global Basel Convention, the latter helped implement the Bamako Convention, because it restricted the exports o f such wastes from industrialized countries to non-OECD countries (Clapp, 1994) .
If Behavioural Interaction is driven by different means o f governance avail able to the institutions involved, it will also virtually always create synergy. In this case, the same group o f actors ideally addresses the same issue within two institutions that pursue the same objectives, but dispose o f different means of governance. Due to matching objectives, behavioural changes triggered by one institution will once again almost automatically serve the ends o f the other institution. Thus, this type o f Behavioural Interaction constitutes the corollary to the additional means type located at the output level and may follow from a case o f that type. Requests for assistance frequently trigger a similar causal chain. As mentioned above, the action taken by the World Customs Organization (W C O ) in response to the request for assistance from CITES in turn supported the implementation o f C ITES.
The Causal Mechanism o f Impact-Level Interaction
Impact-level Interaction rests on the interdependence o f the ultimate gov ernance targets o f the institutions involved. In this case, the ultimate go vernance target o f one institution, such as international trade or the ozone layer, is directly influenced by side-effects originating from the ultimate governance target o f another institution. In this way, Impact-level Interaction exerts influ ence 0 11 the effectiveness o f the target institution. A stylized example that we owe to Arild Underdal illustrates this causal mechanism. Consider that pro tection o f the stocks o f cod and herring are the ultimate targets of two sep arate international institutions. As cod eats herring, successful protection of cod, resulting in a growing population o f this species, will automatically decrease the population o f herring. This causal mechanism does not depend on any action within the target institution or its domain, but rests on the 'functional linkage' (Young, 2002: 23; 8 3 -1 0 9 ) o f the ultimate governance targets o f the institutions involved. In contrast to Behavioural Interaction, inter-institutional influence does not rely on changed behaviour o f relevant actors within the domain o f the target institution (see Figure 2) . Instead, it relies upon the functional link between the ultimate governance targets o f the two institutions involved. In the above-mentioned example, it is increased population o f cod, not human behaviour, that leads directly to a decreasing population o f herring.
Impact-level Interaction evolves in the following steps. First, the source institution produces an output. Second, states and non-state actors operating within the issue-area governed by this institution adapt their behaviour in response. Third, these behavioural changes affect the ultimate governance tar get o f the source institution. Fourth, this impact exerts influence on the ultim ate governance target, and thus on the effectiveness o f the target institution.
The functional linkage o f the ultimate governance targets o f international institutions can be stable, but it may also change in the longer term. In many cases, Impact-level Interaction relies on stable interdependencies o f the bio physical environment, such as the interconnectedness o f the populations of cod and herring. In other cases, however, functional interdependencies are themselves subject to possible long-term change. For example, increased inter national trade and economic growth promoted by the W TO currently lead to increased emissions o f greenhouse gases, and thus undermine the effectiveness of the global climate regime. However, this functional interdependence might one day be overcome by technical progress or changes in production methods.
The rationale o f this causal mechanism does not support any hypothesis as to the systematic quality o f effects. The effects o f Impact-level Interaction on t ie target institution may be synergistic, or disruptive, or indeterminate. Moreover, we cannot yet suggest any meaningful ideal types o f cases driven y this causal mechanism that would systematically create specific effects.
M utual Exclusiveness and Generalizability o f Causal Mechanisms a n d Types
A limited number o f completely different causal mechanisms and more speea types rive interaction among international institutions. They all
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have their inherent rationales, conditions for their occurrence, and expected effects, as reflected in Table 1 . However, considering the multitude o f inter national institutions and the many incidents o f interaction among them, the number o f distinct rationales by which inter-institutional influence can be driven is comparatively limited. The general causal mechanisms presented in the preceding sections con stitute deductively derived and mutually exclusive models. Such models are not intended to provide precise descriptions o f all properties o f relevant interaction cases. They highlight the relevant components o f the different causal pathways o f interaction. Hence, they may, or may not, fit a given case. Mixed cases are unlikely because the mechanisms are located at three differ ent levels o f effectiveness, and they involve different actors. A case o f inter action cannot be driven by Behavioural Interaction and Interaction through Commitment or Impact-level Interaction at the same time.8 In rare cases, it might be difficult to distinguish empirically whether members o f the target institution learn from the source institution (Cognitive Interaction) or adapt their preferences according to the commitments entered into under the source institution (Interaction through Commitment).
The four causal mechanisms are likely to cover the full range o f causal mechanisms relevant for interaction among international institutions. 1 he decision-making process o f an institution may hardly be systematically influ enced other than by knowledge (Cognitive Interaction) and obligations gen erated by another institution (Interaction through Commitment). Likewise, interaction directly influencing the behavioural performance o f the target institution will always originate from the behavioural effects o f the source institution. It seems to be rather unlikely, for example, that the international ozone regime would pass international trade rules that are unrelated to the protection o f the ozone layer and directly influence behaviour related to world trade. Nothing o f that kind has been reported in the literature so far. It is also difficult to see how effects at the impact level within one institution (e.g. increased global welfare) might directly affect the behaviour o f actors governed by another institution (e.g. C 0 2 emissions by industry) or that institution's decision-making process (international climate policies) without first affecting the ultimate target o f governance of the target institution (world climate).
The id e a l types o f institutional interaction also rely 0 11 their own, mutually exclusive rationales. They are theoretically constructed and elucidate a par ticular set o f important characteristics o f cases that are related to their under lying rationales. Like the general causal mechanisms, they have explanatory power (Weber, 19 Both the causal mechanisms and the ideal types presented in this article are generally applicable to the study o f institutional interaction in international governance. While they have been developed against the backdrop o f a sam ple o f cases from environmental governance, and most o f our illustrative examples are from that governance area, they reflect general rationales erive rom theories o f international cooperation and international rela tions.
ey can be employed to analyse cases o f institutional interaction from other samples and policy fields, such as the interaction between: NATO and the European Union's Security and Defence Policy (Whitman, 2 0 0 4 ); dif ferent human rights regimes (Heifer, Cases o f interaction may also 'cluster' around certain issues and institu tions. While causal chains address causation between sequential cases o f interaction, clusters address settings o f parallel cases o f interaction without requiring causation between cases. In this case, several institutions concur rently address a particular issue in complementary or competitive w'ays. Accordingly, we may expect to find competitive interaction clusters (e.g. interaction between the W TO and several environmental regimes). We may also find cooperative clusters, in which particular forms o f inter-institutional division o f labour and coordination develop. For example, C U E S has grad ually become the centre o f a cluster o f institutions in the area o f wildlife pro tection, indicating the emergence o f a more centralized arrangement for inter-institutional management (Lanchbery, 2 0 0 6 ). The International North Sea Conferences have even been established not least to provide for a co-ordinating mechanism, and to set priorities, for future activities in various institutions relevant for the protection o f the North Sea (Skjaerseth, 2006) .
Causal chains and clusters are two typical patterns of interlocking struc tures o f international governance institutions emerging from institutional interaction. While these interlocking structures (Underdal and Young, 2004. 3 7 4 -5 ) reflect the normative expectations of international society, they also define the division o f labour among the institutions involved in a given prob lem area o f international relations. Interlocking governance structures evolve in ways that are distinct from the evolution o f the sector-specific institutions o f which they are composed (Raustiala and Victor, 20 0 4 : 2 7 9 ). So far, they have hardly been 'rationally designed' (Koremenos et al., 2 0 0 1 ) not least because o f the lack o f an overarching institution capable o f managing institutional interaction within the international system. Shedding light on how efforts to enhance international governance may affect each other across d ifferen t issue-areas, th e con cep tu al fram ew ork p resen ted in th is article helps understand th e orig ins o f em erg en t in te rlo ck in g g o v ern a n ce stru ctu res and provides a basis fo r th eir fu rth er system atic study.
Conclusion
The conceptual framework o f institutional interaction developed in this art icle elucidates how an international institution can influence the normative development and the performance o f another international institution. In contrast to other approaches that seek to describe and classify complex inter action situations as a whole (Young, 19 9 6 , 2 0 0 2 ), it focuses on the causal relationship between the institutions involved. W hile actor-centred approaches attribute interaction to forum shopping activities o f relevant actors (Raustiala and Victor, 2 0 0 4 ), it points to the institutionally created opportunities or and restrictions on forum shopping and demonstrates how actors transmit influence from one institution to another. It also captures numerous instances o f institutional interaction that are not intentionally trig gered and thus reaches well beyond intentional forum shopping. e conceptual framework helps structure the multifaceted realm o f inter etW<;en 'nternat>onal institutions, and provides systematic insights strata T " | UUi, nS 8overnance within the international system. It demon-, S 3t r, e ro area °f institutional interaction comprises different n r fr^mena 1 31 must be careflilly distinguished and analysed to grasp their merha Consetj uences °r effective international governance. The four causal to anni-hSmS C j 1C'i ate, °W 'n^uencc can generally travel from one institution erenri»« a n J u J ^ mV attention to the varying roles o f actors, their pref action rrflrrt ° aV1°l!r 111 this process. The more specific ideal types o f intera causal mp ,partlcu ^ characteristics o f different subsets o f cases following conditions fn ^ ^S° provide a ^sis for exploring the necessary * « n * d r SUbS,antiV' fo m ,h d r abl1^ " " ,hC set o f models hiehliahf-^ ° intcract'on -They provide the analyst with a institutions that facilitate f,°SSlble causal rdationships between international tutional interaction These C CXp, f ation o f real-world situations o f insti g a t io n s , much like rhl ., , SUpport the analysis o f interaction ■1 modcls hdp aMly* in stitu tio n s.
The causal mechanisms and ideal types also provide the basis for a more encompassing theory o f institutional interaction. The distinct rationales o f the theoretically derived models o f institutional interaction not only explicate the causal pathways o f institutional interaction, they also help identify the necessary conditions that need to be fulfilled for interaction to occur. In addition, they support the systematic development o f hypotheses concerning the quality o f interaction effects. They demonstrate that different types o f interaction lead systematically either to synergistic or to disruptive effects. Nevertheless, theory development is just starting and we do not claim to have submitted a full-fledged theory o f institutional interaction.
Finally, the causal mechanisms and ideal types help explore more complex interaction situations and the interlocking structures o f international gov ernance institutions. In order to assess the causal relationships between the institutions involved, complex interaction situations must be analytically decomposed into individual cases with unidirectional causal pathways, fol lowing a particular causal mechanism and ideal type. These cases may subse quently be recombined to causal chains and clusters in order to grasp complex interaction situations and start exploring their emergent properties. On this basis, we may gain a conceptually founded idea o f the interlocking structures o f international governance institutions that emerge from complex interac tion situations and shape the normative expectations o f international society.
Notes
1 This article has grown out of the European research project 'Institutional Interaction -How to Prevent Conflicts and Enhance Synergies between International and EU Environmental Institutions', supported by the European Community under its Fifth Framework Programme for Research. We are grateful to the members of the research team for many fruitful discussions. We also thank Oran R. Young, Eva Gross, Rhiannon Williams and two anonymous reviewers for many useful comments. 2 While established research on the effectiveness of international institutions has also used an institution's prime objective as the major yardstick for assessing its conse quences (e.g. Young, 1999; Haas et al., 1993) , the causes and the effects of insti tutional interaction are located in the domains of different institutions. 1 herefore, we take the prime objective of the target institution as the relevant yardstick. 3 The agent-structure problem discussed in International Relations (Wendt, 1987; Carlsnaes, 1992) refers to this issue. 4 The feedback effect constitutes a reverse case of interaction in which influence is transmitted through a different causal mechanism, namely Behavioural Interaction. 5 In some cases, greater homogeneity of interests may also follow from factors other than the size of the institution, such as more homogeneous economic develop ment. The rationale of this type of interaction does not exclude the possibility that the memberships of the interacting institutions are equally large, if they overlap only partially.
6 Thus, meaningful influence can only originate from the smaller institution and affect the larger institution. A transfer o f an obligation from the larger to the smaller insti tution would not be relevant for the effectiveness of governance, because it would not affect the situation of any single actor when making decisions as to behaviour. 7 The adoption o f the obligation in the target institution can thus be expected to trigger a positive feedback effect on the source institution that follows a different causal mechanism, namely Behavioural Interaction. 8 However, separate cases of Behavioural Interaction, Interaction through Commitment and Impact-level Interaction may well occur concurrently or in par allel between the same institutions.
